

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

From: **Justice White**

Circulated: _____

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84-1160-CONCUR

PEMBAUR & CINCINNATI

their authority, they cannot be said to have the authority to
make contrary policy. Had the Sheriff or prosecutor in this
case failed to follow an existing warrant requirement, it
would be absurd to say that he was nevertheless executing
county policy in authorizing the forcible entry in this case and
therefore that the county was responsible for the entry.

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 84-1160

BERTOLD J. PEMBAUR, PETITIONER *v.* CITY OF
CINCINNATI ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[March —, 1986]

JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

The forcible entry made in this case was not then illegal under federal, state, or local law. The City of Cincinnati frankly conceded that forcible entry of third-party property to effect otherwise valid arrests was standard operating procedure. There is no reason to believe that the respondent would abjure using lawful means to execute the capiases issued in this case or had limited the authority of its officers to use force in executing capiases. Further, the county officials who had the authority to approve or disapprove such entries opted for the forceful entry, a choice that was later held to be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Vesting discretion in its officers to use force and its use in this case sufficiently manifested county policy to warrant reversal of the judgment below.

This does not mean that every act of municipal officers with final authority to effect or authorize arrests and searches represents the policy of the municipality. It would be different if *Steagald v. United States*, 451 U. S. 204 (1981), had been decided when the events at issue here occurred, if the state constitution or statutes had forbade forceful entries without a warrant, or if there had been a municipal ordinance to this effect. Local law enforcement officers are expected to obey the law and ordinarily swear to do so when they take office. Where the controlling law places limits on

their authority, they cannot be said to have the authority to make contrary policy. Had the sheriff or prosecutor in this case failed to follow an existing warrant requirement, it would be absurd to say that he was nevertheless executing county policy in authorizing the forceful entry in this case and even stranger to say that the county would be liable if the sheriff had secured a warrant and it turned out that he and the magistrate had mistakenly thought there was probable cause for the warrant. If deliberate or mistaken acts like this, admittedly contrary to local law, expose the county to liability, it must be on the basis of *respondeat superior* and not because the officers' acts represents local policy.

Such results would not conform to *Monell* and the cases following it. I do not understand the Court to hold otherwise in stating that municipal liability attaches where "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." *Ante*, at —. A sheriff, for example, is not the final policy maker with respect to the probable cause requirement for a valid arrest. He has no alternative but to act in accordance with the established standard; and his deliberate or mistaken departure from the controlling law of arrest would not represent municipal policy.

In this case, however, the sheriff and the prosecutor chose a course that was not forbidden by any applicable law, a choice that they then had the authority to make. This was county policy, and it was no less so at the time because a later decision of this Court declared unwarranted forceful entry into third party premises to be violation of the Fourth Amendment.* Hence, I join the Court's opinion and judgment.

*The County has not challenged the retroactivity of *Steagald v. United States*, 451 U. S. 204 (1981), and I do not address that issue.

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