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INSERT P, Into text, at p. 1X.

*A* The Court notes only three features of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act. First, it reproduces statements attesting to the broad remedial scope of the law. Ante, at 13 & n.17. In view of our many decisions recognizing immunity of officers under § 1983, those statements plainly <sup>supra, at —</sup> ~~have no dispositive impact on~~ *shed no light on Congress's* <sup>in fact with respect to</sup> the immunity determination. Second, the Court cites Senator Stevenson's remark that frequently "a statutory liability has been created against municipal corporations for injuries resulting from a neglect of corporate duty." Ante, at 19, citing Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1871). The Senator stated the unobjectionable proposition that municipal immunity could be qualified or abolished by statute. <sup>How does this fragmentary and</sup> ~~His observation offers no support for the Court's~~ <sup>view of the legislative history.</sup> ~~attempt to conjure strict municipal liability from the silence of §~~ 1983.

*emphasized*  
Finally, the Court is ~~impressed by~~ the lack of comment on municipal immunity when opponents to the bill did discuss the immunities of government officers. "Had there been a similar common-law immunity for municipalities, the bill's opponents doubtless would have raised the spectre of its destruction as well." Ante, at 20-21. <sup>This is but another example</sup> ~~One cannot but stand in awe~~ of the Court's continuing willingness to find meaning in silence, particularly when the very next sentence in the Court's opinion concedes, ~~ingenuously~~, "To be sure, there were

