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implausible subject.

The Court today abandons any attempt to harmonize § 1983
with traditional tort law. It points out that municipal immunity may
be abrogated by legislation. Thus, according to the Court, when
Congress included municipalities "within the class of 'persons'
subject to liability under § 1983," it "abolished" municipal
immunity. Ante, at 24.

This reasoning flies in the face of our prior decisions
under this statute. We have held repeatedly that "immunities 'well
grounded in history and reason' [were not] abrogated 'by covert
inclusion in the general language' of § 1983." Imbler v. Pachtman,
supra, 424 U.S., at 418, quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341
U.S., at 376. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S., at 243-244;
Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S., at 554. The singular nature of the
Court's opinion emerges when the status under of executive officers
under § 1983 is compared with that of local governments. State and
local executives are personally liable for bad-faith or unreasonable
constitutional torts. Although Congress has the power to make those
individuals liable for all such deprivations, this Court has refused
to find an abrogation of traditional immunity in a statute that does
not mention immunities. Yet the Court views the enactment of § 1983

as a direct abolition of traditional municipal immunities. Unless the Court is overruling its previous immunity decisions, the silence in § 1983 must mean that the Forty-Second Congress mutely accepted the immunity of executive officers, but silently rejected common-law municipal immunity. I find this interpretation of the statute implausible, at best.

The Court suggests somewhat cryptically that a claim was imposed on Owen when "the city -- through the unanimous resolution of the City Council -- released to the public an allegedly false statement impugning petitioner's honesty and integrity." *Id.* at 10, 11. *The Court fails, however, to identify any* allegedly false statement, other than the one. The resolution did call for public disclosure of the reports on the property tax situation, but those reports were never released. *Id.* at 7. Indeed, petitioner's complaint alleged that the failure to release those reports left a cloud or suspicion of dishonesty over him. App. 3. The resolution also referred the reports to the prosecutor and called on the City Manager to take appropriate action. Neither event could constitute the release of an allegedly false statement, as mentioned by the Court.