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Read M.R. 7.1 - 7.5 and Comments.
Revised Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Lawyer Advertising, 39 J.Mo. Bar 34 (1983). [This Committee was constituted to recommend revised advertising rules to the Court in light of changes in the law regarding commercial speech.]
To properly research lawyer advertising, and to recommend new rules on the subject, an historical perspective may be helpful. Abraham Lincoln advertised his law practice in the newspapers around Springfield, Illinois as early as 1838. See L. Andrews, Birth of a Salesman: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation 1 (A.B.A. 1980). In 1910, shortly after the adoption of the AB A Canons of Ethics, George Archer, Dean of the Suffolk School of Law, wrote: "On the question of advertising there is probably more difference of opinion than upon any other that confronts the lawyer." . . . When the ABA first adopted its Canons on lawyer advertising, House of Delegates member A.A. Freeman of New Mexico told the other delegates: "I do not believe that it is any part of our duty to adopt a code of ethics, the effect of which is to deter the young and aspiring members of the Bar from bringing themselves before the public in a perfectly legitimate way." See 33 A.B.A. Rep. 85 (1908).
Issues relating to the scope of lawyer advertising are likewise not new to the State of Missouri. The first rules relating to the subject were adopted with this state’s first ethics code, in 1906. . . . Substantially identical to the only then existing ethics code for lawyers in the United States, the 1887 Alabama Code, the 1906 Missouri Code provided:
Newspaper advertisements, circulars, and business cards, tendering professional services to the general public, are proper; but special solicitation of particular individuals to become clients ought to be avoided. Indirect advertisements for business, by furnishing or inspiring editorials or press notices, regarding cases in which the attorney takes part, the manner in which they are conducted, the importance of his positions, the magnitude of the interests involved, and all other self-laudation, is of evil tendency, and wholly unprofessional.
This provision continued in Missouri until 1914, when the Missouri Bar adopted the 1908 ABA Canons. . . . ABA Canon 27, as adopted in 1914 in Missouri provided:
the most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisements for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
The provisions of this Canon remained as a guide for the Missouri lawyer from 1913 until 1934. Following [a landmark decision] declaring the court’s plenary power over the practice of law, the court codified the ethics process into Court Rules. . . . Adopting the ABA Canons of Ethics as "the measure of the conduct and responsibility of the members of the bar of this Court and of all lawyers who practice in the State of Missouri," Canon 27 thus became the mandatory advertising standard for all Missouri lawyers.
Canon 27, permitting the publication or circulation of ordinary business cards remained as the rule of Missouri, from the adoption of the Court Rules in 1934 until the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1971. . . . [I]t appears that between 1934 and 1971, the publication of the simple business card was permitted in this State/ As would later be observed by Henry Drinker, such advertising rules were "really rules of professional etiquette rather than of ethics.
On January 1, 1971, the Code of Professional Responsibility became obligatory for all Missouri lawyers. Contained within that Code was Ethical Consideration 2-9, which spoke of "a traditional ban against advertising by lawyers." While the provisions of that ethical consideration thus overstate the history of lawyer advertising in Missouri, it is unquestioned that the provisions of the new D.R. 2-101 did ban virtually all forms of advertising and solicitation by lawyers.
The first challenge to the advertising ban of D.R. 2-101 came in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. Today, while it is unquestioned that the decision in Bates extended some First Amendment protection to lawyer advertising, the decision can also be viewed as the result of a number of competing factors existing immediately prior to the decision. First, the total ban on lawyer advertising, a ban which had prompted one suit by Consumer’s Union, and another challenge against the ABA, on antitrust grounds, by the Department of Justice . . . .; Second, the belief by the Bar that the consumer of legal services was generally uneducated about the role of lawyers, a result supported by the Missouri Bar/Prentice Hall Survey; Third, a belief that the rising cost of legal services was causing many Americans to be unable to use any legal services that were available; and Fourth, a belief that all legal services were unavailable to persons with incomes above the poverty line, but below wealth, a perception that the ABA survey on legal needs was unable to document but which nonetheless existed. . . .In Bates all of these factors coalesced. Bates and O’Steen were former legal services attorneys who perceived that people above the poverty line had unmet legal needs. Their purpose was to perform routine legal services for which persons might not otherwise be able to seek legal counsel. They purposefully charged low fees. Finally, they believed the public would be uneducated about the services offered, and the cost thereof, unless they used the medium of advertising.
In Bates:
The Court did not consider advertising relating to the quality of legal services --- although it was recognized that claims of quality are probably not susceptible to verification by the public and could thus be deceiving.
The Court did not consider solicitation --- particularly in-person solicitation --- although it recognized that such actions could pose significant problems of overreaching.
The Court did not consider advertising of the name and address of the lawyer, the telephone number and related factors already approved as a result of amendments to the existing rule.
The Court did consider the advertising of prices at which certain routine services would be performed.
The Court held that attorney advertising could not be blanketly suppressed.
The Court held that the Bates and O’Steen advertisement was protected commercial speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.
The Court indicated that the states could regulate lawyer advertising and mentioned several permissible areas of regulation:
a) False, misleading or deceptive advertising could be banned;
b) Reasonable restrictions could be placed on the time, place and manner of advertising;
Finally, although recognizing that advertising should not form the entire basis of a consumer’s decision on the choice of a lawyer, the Court chose not to restrict the flow of information to the consumer, indicating instead that any absence of sophistication by the consumer should be resolved in favor of more disclosure, rather than less. The Court placed great faith in the consumer’s ability to discern the nature of advertising:
But advertising by attorneys is not an unmitigated source of harm to the administration of justice. It may offer great benefits. Although the advertising might increase the use of the judicial machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action. As the bar acknowledges, the middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served adequately by the legal profession. . . . Among the reasons for this underutilization is fear of the cost, and an inability to locate a suitable lawyer. . . .Advertising can help to solve this acknowledged problem: Advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of an exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue has served to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable. A rule allowing restrained advertising would be in accord with the bar’s obligation to "facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available."
In response to the decision in Bates, the ABA advanced two possible new rules: Proposal A, a regulatory proposal; and Proposal B, a prohibitory one. Proposal A provided a list of types of adverting that could be used by a lawyer-advertiser, while Proposal B prohibited advertising that was false, fraudulent or deceptive and gave some examples of advertising falling within that classification.
In Missouri, the Supreme Court appointed the Hawkins Committee, which made an extensive study of the Constitutional issues involved in Bates. The Hawkins Committee also studied Proposals A and B of the ABA and elected to propose a rule utilizing the regulatory approach of Proposal A, with substantial modifications. Following the adoption of this new rule, the Court sought the aid of the Advisory Committee, which provided a list of those areas of practice which could be used in advertising.
Missouri was not alone in adopting the regulatory approach to lawyer advertising. The ABA also adopted the provisions of Proposal A, and, in her 1980 survey of advertising changes among the states following Bates, Lori Andrews, a research attorney for the American Bar Foundation, found that some 29 states had followed that model. Of those 29 states, however, Andrews also concluded that 26 of them, including Missouri, would still not permit the very advertising that was approved by the court in Bates.
In June, 1980, the Supreme Court decided Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In its opinion, the Court announced a four-prong test for commercial speech regulation:
At the outset, we must determine (1) whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. (2) Next, we must ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine (3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and (4) whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Because Central Hudson did not involve advertising by lawyers, there was a substantial question as to its applicability to such advertising. The opinion itself did not indicate that it was expanding the rules announced in Bates. Thus, when the Missouri Supreme Court decided R.M.J., it was unclear that Central Hudson was applicable to issues of lawyer advertising, and, consequently, the Missouri Supreme Court elected not to overrule the advertising rule previously adopted by it as a result of the Hawkins Committee report.
As this Committee reads the United States Supreme Court’s decision in R.M.J., it concludes that the Central Hudson test is applicable to lawyer advertising, and reaches the following conclusions:
Truthful advertising relating to lawful activities is generally entitled to protection under the First Amendment as commercial speech;
If the method or content of the advertising makes it inherently misleading, such advertising may be restricted;
If otherwise truthful advertising proves itself misleading in fact, it too can be restricted;
Misleading advertising can generally be prohibited;
Any restrictions on advertising can be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception claimed by the restriction;
Thus, absolute prohibitions may not be made on material which can be presented in a truthful way, such as field of practice advertising;
Truthful advertising may only be regulated if the state demonstrates a substantial state interest in the regulation, and if the regulation furthers that interest, and is no more restrictive than is necessary to further that interest;
The states are freely able to control the practice of lawyer-advertisers, so long as they do so consistently with the forgoing Constitutional guidelines.
Based on all of the foregoing, the Committee has developed a draft of the permissible purposes of lawyer-advertising:
1. To provide a method for members of the public who need a lawyer to obtain information about lawyers;
a. By public, the Committee refers to all members of the public, together with corporations and other groups of persons;
b. Such methodology will necessarily create competition among members of the profession;
c. Such information would probably include personal information about the lawyer, but is not thereby limited;
2. To provide information to the public about their rights so the public can make informed decisions about the need to employ a lawyer;
3. To provide information about special competencies of particular lawyers in special areas (e.g., field of practice advertising);
4. To protect the First Amendment commercial speech rights of lawyer-advertisers;
5. To assist the public in a general understanding of the role of a lawyer as a professional.
Recognizing, then, that advertising by lawyers should generally be permitted, the Committee finds that the following regulatory measures would aid those purposes:
Regulation to prevent the dissemination of misleading information as to any of the purposes of advertising;
Regulation to prevent abuse and/or harassment of the public even from truthful advertising;
Regulation of the inherently misleading nature of qualitative advertising;
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