A "lawyer’s responsibility

A "lawyer’s responsibility with relation to client perjury" was the subject of ABA Formal Opinion 87-353 (1987). That Opinion noted that "Model Rule 3.3(a) and (b) represent a major policy change . . . . It is now mandatory, under these Model Rule provisions, for a lawyer, who knows the client has committed perjury, to disclose this knowledge to the tribunal if the lawyer cannot persuade the client to rectify the perjury." Is this clear from the rules?

As the Opinion explains it:

Rule 3.3(a)(2) and (4) complement each other. While (a)(4), itself, does not expressly require disclosure by the lawyer to the tribunal of the client's false testimony after the lawyer has offered it and learns of its falsity, such disclosure will be the only 'reasonable remedial [measure]' the lawyer will be able to take if the client is unwilling to rectify the perjury. The Comment to Rule 3.3 states that disclosure of the client's perjury to the tribunal would be required of the lawyer by (a)(4) in this situation.

Although Rule 3.3(a)(2), unlike 3.3(a)(4), does not specifically refer to perjury or false evidence, it would require an irrational reading of the language: 'a criminal or fraudulent act by the client,' to exclude false testimony by the client. While broadly written to cover all crimes or frauds a client may commit during the course of the proceeding, Rule 3.3(a)(2), in the context of the whole of Rule 3.3, certainly includes perjury.

Since 3.3(a)(2) requires disclosure to the tribunal only when it is necessary to 'avoid assisting' client perjury, the important question is what conduct of the lawyer would constitute such assistance. Certainly, the conduct proscribed in Rule 3.3(a)(4)--offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false-- is included. Also, a lawyer's failure to take remedial measures, including disclosure to the court, when the lawyer knows the client has given false testimony, is included. It is apparent to the Committee that as used in Rule 3.3(a)(2), the language 'assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client' is not limited to the criminal law concepts of aiding and abetting or subornation. Rather, it seems clear that this language is intended to guide the conduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court as a prophylactic measure to protect against client perjury contaminating the judicial process. Thus, when the lawyer knows the client has committed perjury, disclosure to the tribunal is necessary under Rule 3.3(a)(2) to avoid assisting the client's criminal act.

Furthermore, as previously indicated, contrary to Formal Opinions 287 and 341 and the exception provided in DR 7-102(B)(1) of the Model Code, the disclosure requirement of Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) and (4) is not excused because of client confidences. Rule 3.3(b) provides in pertinent part: 'The duties stated in paragraph (a) . . . apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.' Thus, the lawyer's responsibility to disclose client perjury to the tribunal under Rule 3.3(a)(2) and (4) supersedes the lawyer's responsibility to the client under Rule 1.6.

It seems clear that, at least in litigation settings where candor to the court is the competing value, a lawyer has an obligation to prevent or correct client perjury, even to the extent of disclosing confidential information to the court. But what if the perjury is not discovered until after the proceedings are over? Rule 3.3 would appear to let the attorney "off the hook." Rule 3.3(b) indicates that the obligations in paragraph (a) "continue to the conclusion of the proceedings," and the Commentary elaborates as follows: "A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify the presentation of false evidence has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation." Comment to Rule 3.3, at ¶ 13.

What is the justification for ending the lawyer’s responsibility at the conclusion of the proceeding? Does this make sense? What restrictions on the lawyer remain in such circumstances? See Rule 1.2(d).

When does "a tribunal" become involved for purposes of this rule? What about the client who lies in a deposition? Arguably, there’s no tribunal involved at that point. Do we look to Rule 3.3 for guidance? Or should we look to Rule 4.1, which addresses truthfulness in statements to others. Note that, unlike 3.3, 4.1 does not have a confidentiality override. The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has determined that Rule 3.3 applies in such circumstances, see Formal Opinion 93-376, but there is reason to question that resolution. While it is clear that an attorney may not use the deposition testimony at trial if the lawyer has discovered its falsity, is it clear that the lawyer must take remedial measures prior to that time? Can the attorney merely withdraw from the representation? Can the withdrawal be "noisy?" Can the lawyer just settle quickly without disclosing? These are difficult questions, the resolution of which turns on which values and principles take precedence.

When do the duties of Rule 3.3 "kick in?" When does a lawyer "know" evidence is false, or that failure to disclose is necessary to assist the client in a fraud? See the terminology section of the Rules. Can a lawyer avoid knowing? Can he or she do so consistent with good lawyering and one’s obligations of competence under Rule 1.1? How certain must a lawyer be before taking action? And just what is the judge to do?

These issues were addressed by the Court in United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 444-47 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 828 (1991):

In the instant case, Jackson's lawyer asked to approach the bench after the government had presented its case. The lawyer told the trial judge that Jackson wanted to testify and that he was concerned about his testimony. The lawyer said he advised Jackson not to take the stand. The judge excused the jury and everyone else in the courtroom, except a United States Marshal, Jackson, and his lawyer. At that point, the lawyer said, "I'm not sure if it wouldn't be appropriate for me to move for a withdrawal from this case based upon what I think may be elicited on the stand.... I'm concerned about the testimony that may come out and I'm concerned about my obligation to the Court." The trial judge informed Jackson he had a right under the law to testify on his own behalf, which Jackson said he understood. The court also informed Jackson that his counsel was bound by his professional obligation not to place evidence before the court which he believed to be untrue. Jackson also said he understood this. The judge stated that Jackson could take the stand and give a narrative statement without questioning from his lawyer. The judge noted that if Jackson's attorney found "things which he believes to be not true ... he may have other obligations at that point." The lawyer responded that he had again discussed the matter with Jackson and that Jackson had decided, on his own, not to testify. Upon questioning by the judge, Jackson again stated that he understood his right to testify and his attorney's obligations. Jackson thereupon informed the court that he did not wish to testify.

This case differs from Whiteside in three respects. Each difference raises important questions which can only be answered after an evidentiary hearing.

First, in Whiteside, a finding was made that Whiteside would have testified falsely had he given the testimony he initially wanted to give. . . . Such a finding has not been made here. In terms of a possible violation of Jackson's rights, this is crucial. If, for example, Jackson's lawyer had no basis for believing Jackson would testify falsely and Jackson, in fact, wanted to testify truthfully, a violation of his rights would occur.

We do not know what measures Jackson's attorney took to determine whether Jackson would lie on the stand. He was required to take such measures as would give him "a firm factual basis" for believing Jackson would testify falsely. As we stated in our opinion in Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1323, rev'd on other grounds, sub nom Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 157:

Counsel must act if, but only if, he or she has "a firm factual basis" for believing that the defendant intends to testify falsely or has testified falsely.... It will be a rare case in which this factual requirement is met. Counsel must remember that they are not triers of fact, but advocates. In most cases a client's credibility will be a question for the jury.

The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Whiteside emphasizes the necessity of such caution on the part of defense counsel in determining whether a client has or will commit perjury. In discussing the attorney's duty to report possible client perjury, the majority states that it extends to "a client's announced plans to engage in future criminal conduct." Thus, a clear expression of intent to commit perjury is required before an attorney can reveal client confidences.

The concurring opinions in Whiteside support this interpretation. Justice Stevens advised circumspection: "A lawyer's certainty that a change in his client's recollection is a harbinger of intended perjury * * * should be tempered by the realization that, after reflection, the most honest witness may recall (or sincerely believe he recalls) details that he previously overlooked." And, Justice Blackmun in his concurrence observed that "[e]xcept in the rarest of cases, attorneys who adopt 'the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts' ... pose a danger of depriving their clients of the zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment."⁵

Justices Blackmun and Stevens focus in their concurring opinions on the reasons the majority opinion carefully limits its holding to "announced plans" to commit perjury. The tensions between the rights of the accused and the obligations of her attorney are considerable in the context of potential client perjury. Justice Stevens points to the potential inaccuracy of a lawyer's perception. For many reasons, a lawyer's perception may be incorrect. Ideally, a client will tell her lawyer "everything." But "everything" may not be one consistent explanation of an event. Not only may a client overlook and later recall certain details, but she may also change intended testimony in an effort to be more truthful. Moreover, even a statement of an intention to lie on the stand does not necessarily mean the client will indeed lie once on the stand. Once a client hears the testimony of other witnesses, takes an oath, faces a judge and jury, and contemplates the prospect of cross-examination by opposing counsel, she may well change her mind and decide to testify truthfully.

As Justice Blackmun observes, an attorney who acts on a belief of possible client perjury takes on the role of the fact finder, a role which perverts the structure of our adversary system. A lawyer who judges a client's truthfulness does so without the many safeguards inherent in our adversary system. He likely makes his decision alone, without the assistance of fellow fact finders. He may consider too much evidence, including that which is untrustworthy. Moreover, a jury's determination on credibility is always tempered by the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A lawyer, finding facts on his own, is not necessarily guided by such a high standard. Finally, by taking a position contrary to his client's interest, the lawyer may irrevocably destroy the trust the attorney-client relationship is designed to foster. That lack of trust cannot easily be confined to the area of intended perjury. It may well carry over into other aspects of the lawyer's representation, including areas where the client needs and deserves zealous and loyal representation. For these reasons and others, it is absolutely essential that a lawyer have a firm factual basis before adopting a belief of impending perjury.

The record before us does not disclose whether Jackson's lawyer had a firm factual basis for believing his client would testify falsely. This can only be adequately determined after an evidentiary hearing.

Second, in Whiteside, the defendant did testify and was " 'restricted' or restrained only from testifying falsely." Here, Jackson did not testify at all. It simply is impossible to determine from the record before us whether Jackson was "restrained" by his lawyer from giving truthful testimony. Again, this can only be determined after an evidentiary hearing.

Third, in Whiteside, the defense attorney did not reveal his belief about his client's anticipated testimony to the trial court. In contrast, the disclosure to the trial court here was quite explicit. The attorney said to the judge that he might have to withdraw because of what might be elicited on the stand. Such a disclosure cannot be taken lightly. Even in a jury trial, where the judge does not sit as the finder of fact, the judge will sentence the defendant, and such a disclosure creates "significant risks of unfair prejudice" to the defendant.⁶

We note that, once the possibility of client perjury is disclosed to the trial court, the trial court should reduce the resulting prejudice. It should limit further disclosures of client confidences, inform the attorney of his other duties to his client, inform the defendant of her rights, and determine whether the defendant desires to waive any of those rights. The trial judge here acted primarily with these concerns in mind. The judge discussed the conflict with only the attorney and his client present. He prevented further disclosures of client confidences. He advised Jackson of his right to testify and determined that Jackson understood his rights and his attorney's ethical obligation not to place false testimony before the court. He advised Jackson that if he took the stand, his lawyer would be required to refrain from questioning Jackson on issues which the lawyer believed Jackson would perjure himself and that Jackson would have to testify in narrative form.⁷ He then directly asked Jackson if he wished to testify. We add that a trial court should also impress upon defense counsel and the defendant that counsel must have a firm factual basis before further desisting in the presentation of the testimony in question.

Under such a procedure, the chance for violations of the defendant's constitutional rights will be reduced, the revelation of further client confidences will be prevented, and the defendant can make a knowing waiver of her constitutional right to testify and to counsel.⁸ It will also be necessary to establish that the waiver was voluntary and that the defendant's rights were not violated prior to the waiver. Such inquiries, however, are best made at an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

The most weighty decision in a case of possible client perjury is made by the lawyer who decides to inform the court, and perhaps incidentally his adversary and the jury, of his client's possible perjury. This occurs when the lawyer makes a motion for withdrawal (usually for unstated reasons) or allows his client to testify in narrative form without questioning from counsel. Once this has been done, the die is cast. The prejudice will have occurred. At a minimum, the trial court will know of the defendant's potential perjury. For this reason, defense counsel must use extreme caution before revealing a belief of impending perjury. It is, as Justice Blackmun noted, "the rarest of cases" where an attorney should take such action. Once the disclosure of the potential client perjury has occurred, the trial judge can limit the resulting prejudice by preventing further disclosures of client confidences, by informing the attorney of the obligation to his client, and by informing the client of her rights and determining whether she desires to waive any of them. The determination whether the prejudice was undue must occur at an evidentiary hearing. . . .

Finally, what constitutes "false evidence" or a "material fact?" And what constitutes "assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client?" These terms are not self-defining, yet their meaning is crucial to understanding the attorney’s obligations.

Generally, an attorney does not have a duty, beyond that posed by the general duties of competence and diligence, to investigate a client’s story. See generally Annotated Rules, 320-21. An attorney is not a guarantor of the accuracy of his or her client’s statements. Where, however, an attorney has doubts, the attorney may not close his or her eyes to the truth.

In In re Oberhellman, 873 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. banc 1994), an attorney attempted to avoid discipline under Rule 3.3 for giving false answers in an interrogatory he prepared for the client and in advising the client to testify falsely in a deposition regarding her residence for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. The court rejected the attorney’s argument that facts necessary to establish jurisdiction were not "material." Id. at 854. The respondent attorney in In re Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. banc 1992), avoided a finding of violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (2) because the client’s false statement regarding her married name (and by implication marital status) was not material, but the attorney was nevertheless disciplined under 3.3(a)(4), which does not have a materiality requirement, for calling the client by her previous name on the witness stand and advising her to testify using that name despite her recent remarriage. Respondent attorney had also advised the client to remove her wedding ring prior to taking the witness stand. He was disciplined despite the fact that he told the client to answer questions about her marital status truthfully if they were asked, although he did tell her not to volunteer information on this issue if not asked.

Note that Rule 3.3 allows less than complete loyalty to the client even where the lawyer does not "know" the evidence is false. Rule 3.3(c) allows the lawyer to refuse to offer evidence the lawyer "reasonably believes" is false. The lawyer may not disclose in such circumstances, but this Rule allows the lawyer to override the client’s wishes in such situations. Is the "reasonable belief" standard high enough? See Annotated Rules at 322-23. Is this an appropriate resolution?